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Abstract 
 
This case study analyzes the impact of theory-based 
factors on the implementation of different blockchain 
technologies in use cases from the energy sector. We 
construct an integrated research model based on the 
Diffusion of Innovations theory, institutional economics 
and the Technology-Organization-Environment 
framework. Using qualitative data from in-depth 
interviews, we link constructs to theory and assess their 
impact on each use case. Doing so we can depict the 
dynamic relations between different blockchain 
technologies and the energy sector. The study provides 
insights for decision makers in electric utilities, and 
government administrations. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Blockchain is making headlines as the next step in 
the evolution of the internet in contemporary tech, 
finance and energy press outlets. Simultaneously, the 
emergence of renewable, Distributed Energy Resources 
(DER) and smart grids creates a network, in which 
innumerable devices can automatically communicate 
with each other. Regardless of the hype, the potential for 
blockchain in the energy sector appears promising. The 
automation of processes, disintermediation and the 
rethinking of value chains grant degrees of freedom for 
innovative applications and business models. Yet, there 
are only few market-ready blockchain services, but 
rather pilot projects in which specific applications are 
tested. Although most publications refer to ‘the’ 
blockchain, a comprehensive view requires a 
differentiation between multiple blockchain 
technologies. Therefore, we analyze the distinctive 
characteristics of these technologies and the socio-
economical and institutional context and their 
relationship to one another. To explain the dynamics, we 
address the following research question: 
How and by which factors is the implementation of 
blockchain technologies in energy sector use cases 
affected? 
We utilize a theoretical framework and in-depth 
interviews for this analysis. To our knowledge, this is 
the first paper to evaluate the implementation of 
different blockchains in use cases from the energy 
sector. Former research has aimed to define a decision 
model for blockchain adoption based on the TOE 
framework [8]. However, these authors do not make the 
crucial differentiation between distinct types of 
blockchain technologies and different business areas. 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 
describes the research process, followed by an overview 
of seminal theoretical literature in section 3. 
Subsequently, section 4 provides essential background 
information for the energy sector and blockchain 
technologies. In section 5, relevant factors impacting on 
decision makers are discussed, while section 6 analyzes 
implications of these factors for energy use cases. The 
concluding section 7 summarizes the most important 
insights and limitations and provides an outlook on 
future research. 
 
2. Methodology  
 
While there is a great body of non-scientific 
literature on the application of blockchains in different 
use cases [9, 20, 27], few articles are published in peer-
reviewed scientific journals. After an initial literature 
search with literature databases (EBSCOhost, Google 
Scholar) we found Yli-Huumo’s [49] overview as an 
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identifier for research gaps. Based on that we formulated 
preliminary research questions and initiated the search 
for a suitable framework. After reviewing the seminal 
body of literature in this field, we decided to use an 
integrated framework based on the theoretical 
background described in Section 3,  
 While searching for appropriate interviewees, we 
intentionally used our professional network instead of 
random sampling to consult experts in specific domains 
of blockchains and energy. We found 22 appropriate 
interviewees from three distinct groups: (A) Energy 
sector decision makers (B) blockchain experts (C) 
researchers. We designed a pool of a dozen open 
interview questions based on our research aims and 
adjusted them according to individual interviewees’ 
parameters (experience, attitude, position, etc.). All 
interviews were executed on the telephone, except for 
two email interviews. We used an in-depth and semi-
structured interview design as suggested by Bewley [3]. 
Subsequently, we used open coding to identify relevant 
variables in the qualitative data, and axial coding to 
connect these variables to general factors [13]. We then 
assigned these general factors from our data to the 
framework (Figure 1). 
 
To design a valid case study, we used multiple 
sources of evidence in terms of different mediums 
(phone, email and literature) as well as different 
stakeholders at different points of the research. To 
safeguard reliability as suggested in [48], we repeated 
the coding process by different researchers [29]. We 
maintained a database with all data about the interviews, 
as well as a protocol to document the ongoing progress 
of the study for all participating researchers. 
 
3. Theoretical framework  
 
We reviewed the seminal literature for technological 
innovation while searching for an appropriate 
framework four our study. Regarding the domain of 
blockchains, our analysis requires a sound theoretical 
foundation that reflects (a) the specific properties of the 
blockchain technology, (b) the dynamics of 
organizations utilizing blockchains, (c) the highly 
regulated nature of the energy sector, and (d) the 
external effects of such a networked technology. 
During this process, we reviewed the Technology 
Acceptance Model (TAM) [42] and the Unified Theory 
of Acceptance and Use of Technology (UTAUT) [43], 
but we eventually dismissed these frameworks due to 
their focus on individual behavior and lacking 
importance of environmental and institutional factors. 
In contrast to that, the commonly applied Diffusion of 
Innovations theory (DOI) investigates underlying 
mechanisms of diffusion and assesses how an 
innovation can be implemented in a social system. The 
most prominent contribution in this field was made by 
Rogers [34], who discusses the dynamics between the 
technological innovation itself, organizations to adopt 
the innovation and communication channels of the 
regarded social system, which addresses (a) and (b).  
Building on this, DePietro et al. [16] established the 
Technology-Organization-Environment framework 
(TOE) to display constraints and opportunities of a 
technological innovation in organizations. They 
complement Rogers’ work by adding an environmental 
component to the framework. This component flexibly 
embodies relations of the organization towards external 
units such as government, competition, or technology 
infrastructure, addressing (c). 
DOI has been criticized for disregarding standards, 
network externalities and path dependence [25]. 
Accordingly, DOI researchers are advised to consider 
the nature of the technology, the critical role of 
institutional structures, strategies of stakeholders and 
the installed infrastructure. Similarly, critics of TOE 
state, that the flexibility of the framework is gained at 
the expense of accuracy. To address this, the 
incorporation of network externalities, described for 
instance in [37] has been suggested by [1]. In order to 
supplement the shortcomings of DOI and TOE as well 
as to address (d), we took on an economic perspective 
on blockchains as suggested by [15], drawing on 
seminal works in the field of institutional and 
information economics such as [6] and [37], considering 
network externalities and rent-seeking behavior.  
 Based on the reviewed literature, we decided to 
construct a flexible integrated research framework to 
carry out a phronetic analysis as proposed in [17]. 
Phronetic research is a pragmatic interpretation of the 
research object and thus well applicable to case studies. 
It does not aim to develop new theories or yield causal 
evidence, but rather to contribute to practical rationality 
by investigating the dynamics of power and relations in 
a social context. With this approach, we aim to reflect 
the dynamics of blockchain in the energy sector. 
 
 
Figure 1. Research process 
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4. Background  
 
In this section, we differentiate the characteristics of 
blockchain technologies and we illustrate 
contemporary developments in the environment of the 
energy sector. 
 
4.1. The energy sector 
 
Energy markets are facing changes induced by 
technological and socio-economic developments. The 
energy generation transitions from conventional 
thermal power plants to distributed energy resources. 
This induces fluctuating supply, increasing uncertainty. 
Energy trade becomes more complex. Additionally, 
smart meter gateway tethered devices are replacing 
analogous meters. The heterogeneous generation is 
causing high volatility. Accordingly, supply and price 
are subject to high levels of uncertainty. DER such as 
power-heat coupling plants, photovoltaic installations 
and biogas plants are becoming more popular for 
residents and local organizers. An increasing share of 
energy demand can be provided locally, making the grid 
balancing a challenging task. The changes of the energy 
market increase participation and empowerment for 
customers, enabling them to optimize domestic 
consumption and to switch retailers [14]. 
 
4.2 Distributed ledger technology 
 
A decade ago, the Bitcoin white paper published by 
Satoshi Nakamoto [28], introduced the revolutionary 
concept of  blockchains. The so-called distributed 
ledgers are records of transactions distributed to every 
computer in the participating network [40]. Unlike 
normal databases, it is updated by all network 
participants. This process is called Proof-of-Work 
(PoW). Miners compete against each other to solve an 
algorithmic puzzle and the fastest contestant updates the 
database. Trust, which is usually provided by 
intermediaries is achieved by the collaboration of the 
masses [41]. While every entity that participates in a 
blockchain can review the stored information, changes 
to the database can only be implemented by reaching a 
consensus. Contemporary blockchains have started to 
include so-called smart contracts that are negotiated 
between parties, stored in code and executed 
autonomously. Smart contracts enhance the blockchain 
technology to a system of distributed applications and 
markets [30]. While the term ‘blockchain’ often refers 
to permissionless distributed ledgers, several 
publications differentiate between those, permissioned, 
and consortium blockchains [2, 44].   
 
 
4.3. Public (permissionless) blockchains 
 
The prominent blockchains Bitcoin and Ethereum 
are permissionless and public (Table 1). These ledgers 
are accessible to anyone and participants are represented 
by a random ID (pseudonymity). There is no central 
provider to supervise the ongoing traffic or to admit new 
applications. Permissionless blockchains allow the 
participation of random unknown devices without initial 
checks of trustworthiness. These blockchains 
historically rely on the PoW consensus mechanism, in 
which every miner can validate new data blocks. 
However, some blockchains have already implemented 
efficient alternatives, such as the “Proof-of-Stake” 
mechanism (PoS), which randomly selects network 
participants who own a stake of the network’s tokens to 
validate transactions [7]. 
 
4.4. Private (permissioned) blockchains 
 
Permissioned (private) blockchains only grant 
access to known participants, who might have rights to 
read and/or write data. The system provider has full 
control over the blockchain and he knows all 
participants a priori. Generally, he can roll back certain 
processes making permissioned blockchains potentially 
reversible. The validation of single blocks is possible at 
much lower resource consumption and higher speed, as 
not all participants are simultaneously working on the 
solution of the algorithmic puzzle. Instead, in the Proof-
of-Authority (PoA) consensus mechanism, a single 
node generates new data blocks. The formerly described 
PoS can also be employed in permissioned 
Table 1. Blockchain characteristics  [2, 44]  
 Public Private Consortium 
Access Permissionless Permissioned Shared Perm. 
Personal 
information Pseudonymity Known Known 
Device 
authentication Not required Required Conditional 
Consensus 
mechanism PoW, PoS 
PoS, PoA, 
PBFT 
PoW,PoS, 
PoA 
Security Decentralized control 
Single point 
of failure 
Various 
 
Transaction 
speed Low (PoW) Rather High 
Higher than 
public 
Energy 
consumption High (PoW Rather Low Rather low 
System costs High Rather low Medium to low 
Individual 
costs Low Rather high Various 
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environments. For instance the open-source PoS engine 
Tendermint can be used as the base infrastructure for 
different types of blockchains [7]. A similar approach, 
the Practical Byzantine Fault-Tolerant (PBFT)  
consensus algorithm [10] is utilized by Hyperledger 
Fabric [18]. Based on PBFT, a single authority issues 
permissions for membership to a network of known 
participants, in which only few whitelisted nodes 
validate transactions. 
 
4.5. Consortium blockchains and multi-purpose 
technologies 
 
Consortium blockchains are a compromise between 
public and private blockchains in which only verified 
participants can validate blocks. These blockchains 
offer the possibility to be tailored towards the specific 
requirements of the consortium, e.g. by removing 
pseudonymity. Apart from the three blockchains 
categories established in prior works [44], there is a 
multitude of protocols, forks and platforms that can be 
incorporated or built on as blockchain components. For 
instance, Tendermint is most prominently used as the 
core of the Cosmos project, which aims at enabling a 
seamless exchange of tokens between different 
blockchains [7, 23]. Similarly, Ethereum’s co-founder 
Gavin Wood developed Polkadot [47], a relay channel 
network to parallelize different chains. The other 
Ethereum co-founder Vitalik Buterin is involved in 
Plasma, a concept to scale different blockchains in 
Ethereum smart contracts [32]. Due to the appearance of 
the versatile technologies stated above, the categorical 
differentiation of distributed ledger technologies has 
become more complex throughout the last year. For this 
work, the main characteristic to categorize a blockchain 
is the access to the network and consensus mechanism 
that defines which entities are permitted to validate 
transactions. 
 
5. Critical factors in the domain of 
blockchain technologies 
 
In this section, we assess the innovation diffusion 
factors from the theory, linked with the most relevant 
factors impacting on the use of blockchain technologies 
from our qualitative data. The mapping of axial codes 
from the interviews to theory-based factors is depicted 
in Table 2. 
 
5.1. Market power and competitive pressure 
 
Competitive pressure is an established pillar of 
innovation diffusion research.  Customer power, threat 
of new entrants, industry rivalry and threat of substitutes 
impact on market power dynamics [33]. Incumbents 
holding significant market power, generally aim to keep 
the status quo instead of sponsoring innovative 
technologies. If an innovation arises, pressure from 
startups and customers increases. To secure the market 
share, incumbents will likely engage with the 
innovation, yet prevent the occurrence of network 
externalities that may benefit competitors. Therefore, a 
company in a dominant market position may not support 
efforts to foster interoperability. Instead, it may capture 
this process, tighten path dependencies and aim to raise 
switching-costs [37]. 
 
5.2. Regulation and rent-seeking behavior 
 
The regulatory environment refers to the support or 
barriers given by a government authority and is 
considered to be a major factor for technological 
innovation [50].  
Although no blockchain-specific regulation has 
passed legislation so far, obligatory guidelines for the 
registration as market participants may be a an obstacle 
for permissionless blockchains [36]. Further, regulation 
generally relies on the written form. Conventional 
contracts are characterized by a certain degree of 
openness, can be interpreted in certain ways and are not 
suitable to be represented by a smart contract. When a 
contracted service is not being delivered, no mediator 
will enforce laws and nobody may be found liable in a 
permissionless blockchain [2]. The application of smart 
contracts is therefore less problematic within 
permissioned blockchains, where all participants are 
known. 
Since regulation is part of a complex legislative 
process involving government agents and public 
representatives, there is potential for political rent-
seeking as described in [6].  Blockchain technologies 
generally pose a threat for power-holding entities as 
they efficiently distribute information and decrease the 
necessity for established stakeholders. 
 
5.3. Technology characteristics 
 
The emphasis on technology characteristics in the 
DOI theory equates with the categorization of 
technology in the TOE framework [1]. The interviews 
exhibited three codes linked to technology 
characteristics. 
Transparency. Lack of trust forces trading parties 
either to rely on manual processes or to engage 
presumably trustworthy intermediates. Whenever such 
an intermediary agent is employed, principal-agent 
problems and rent-seeking behavior induced by 
incomplete contracts can arise [11]. These 
manifestations may be addressed with distributed 
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ledgers. In a permissionless blockchain all current and 
historic transactions are publicly viewable, creating full 
transparency of the network. Doing so, permissionless 
blockchains can eliminate opportunism [15]. In contrast, 
permissioned blockchains can be configured to provide 
transparent information to network participants (or even 
the public). However, the governing authority can easily 
withdraw this feature. Accordingly, optional 
transparency in the absence of real immutability may 
not foster trust in the same way a permissionless 
blockchain can. Incomplete contracts remain an issue 
since smart contracts in blockchain are less complete 
than conventional ones [2]. Unspecified when-if-
relations in smart contracts, can still be exploited by 
human behavior. Accordingly a full substitution of trust 
by blockchains is only feasible in markets using non-
human agents like a Decentralized Autonomous 
Organization (DAO), while human involvement leaves 
room for the execution of power dynamics [15]. 
Transaction speed. Today the capacity of 
permissionless blockchains is sufficient for discrete 
tasks. For a large-scale use of the technology however, 
the transaction speed of is one of the key limiting 
factors. The Ethereum blockchain currently allows only 
for 10–20 transaction per second (tps). For comparison, 
the Visa network carries out 1667 tps (PayPal 193 tps) 
on average [51]. Current permissionless blockchains are 
not yet suitable for high-frequency transactions when 
PoW is used. In contrast to that, permissioned 
blockchains do not have any technology-specific 
restrictions regarding the transaction speed. All nodes in 
the network are known and trustworthy, thus the 
validation of transactions is trivial. The PBFT 
mechanism is built to reach consensus fast and 
efficiently, allowing tens of thousands tps [45]. 
Currently, the Energy Web Foundation (EWF), funded 
by the Rocky Mountain Institute is establishing a PoA-
based permissioned blockchain platform. Building on 
Ethereum as a basis, this platform uses so-called state 
channels, in which results of transactions are grouped 
together in a smart contract. This significantly increase 
the scalability of blockchain transactions. The state 
channel network Kovan for instance reaches 1.000 tps 
[52]. 
Transaction costs. Generally, the innovation 
literature considers costs to be an inhibitor of 
technology use [24]. The experts from our interviews 
considered this true for permissionless blockchains. At 
the same time, they identified permissioned 
blockchains’ cost-effectiveness to be a major advantage.  
Permissionless blockchains’ system costs (with PoW) 
are perceived as a key obstacle. The operation costs of 
the Ethereum network amounts 93.440.000$ per year 
[39]. However, these operational costs mostly consist of 
the transaction fees. A simple Ethereum transaction 
costs about $0,12 cents on the current exchange rate 
[46], which is still inexpensive compared to existing 
payment service providers (PayPal: $0.30 plus 2.9% of 
the volume [53]). 
 
5.4. Security  
 
In the domain of security, our qualitative data 
exhibited codes that equated to the basic components of 
computer security (confidentiality, integrity and 
availability [4]).   
Table 2. Axial coding from qualitative data 
 
Theory-based factors Axial codes n Exemplary quote from interviews 
Competitive Pressure Market power 17 Customers are longing for someone who is in charge, a service contact. This only works in permissioned blockchains. 
Regulatory Environment Regulation 14 The current regulation regarding grid fees prevent new business models and thus innovation. Rent-Seeking Behavior 
Technology characteristics 
 
Transaction Speed 12 The potential for permissionless blockchains is limited by transactions speed. 
Transparency 16 When all generation data is transparent, we will experience less conflicts regarding shared ownership of pv systems. 
Transact. Costs 20 In some areas, we can reduce about 80% of the operational costs. 
Security  
Integrity 18 Inside the blockchain all data is safe. It is the interface to the physical world where threats occur. 
Confidentiality 12 The right to be forgotten is not applicable in blockchains. 
Availability 4 Permissionless blockchains are always available. Not even the IT systems of stock exchanges can provide that. 
Compatibility 
Interoperability 14 In permissionless blockchains, devices that have not met before can spontaneously make transactions with each other. Network Externalities 
Path Dependencies 
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Integrity. The immutability feature of blockchains 
(the prevention of unauthorized change) is a key 
characteristic for data integrity. A permissionless 
blockchain is immutable, as it is almost impossible to 
alter stored information without being detected. Doing 
so, an attacker would need 50% of the network’s 
computing power when based on PoW [35]. Although 
the resilience against internal or external threats has yet 
to be investigated, a major vulnerability in a 
Decentralized Application (DApp) has been exposed by 
the prominent case of the so-called “Ethereum DAO-
Hack”, in which an incomplete smart contract enabled a 
financial exploit. 
Due to the similarity to centralized systems, 
permissioned and consortium blockchains do not exhibit 
a specific advantage regarding integrity, since nodes in 
permissioned blockchains can easily agree to alter the 
existing database. 
Availability. In the TOE framework, availability 
refers to the accessibility of a given technology for an 
organization. Unlike in centralized architectures, 
blockchains are not subject to a single point of failure. 
Although an attack may hit the permission-issuing entity 
in private blockchains, several other nodes store 
identical copies of the database, safeguarding its 
availability. Even further, permissionless blockchains 
are shared among large numbers of participants [41]. If 
one entity of the network breaks off, the remaining 
participants will keep the system running. However, 
while a distributed infrastructure is resilient to shocks, 
most DApps run on few conventional web servers, 
which can be hacked. 
Confidentiality. Although permissionless 
blockchains provide pseudonymity, it is possible to 
identify entities behind the unique address by analyzing 
the data on blockchain [38]. Blockchains hold personal 
information that remain in the distributed database due 
to the immutability characteristic. Although the 
legislative environment of many countries grants 
customers the right to have personal information 
removed or transferred (data portability), this is not 
feasible in a permissionless blockchain unless a hard 
fork of the entire chain is carried out. Although this 
affects permissioned blockchains as well, central 
authority makes it easier to cut-off parts of the 
transaction history.  
 
5.5. Compatibility and network externalities 
 
In the DOI literature, compatibility refers to the 
suitability of a technology within a given technological 
system of an organization [34]. Consistent with that, our 
interviewees identified the interoperability of different 
devices within networks as a major determinant for 
technology implementation. The value of a network is 
determined by the number of its participants [5]. When 
path dependence is present, the establishment of a 
practical migration strategy is important to secure a 
critical mass of network traffic. One way is to cooperate 
with other stakeholders and engage in standardization 
efforts to minimize switching costs [37]. In this context, 
the International Organization for Standardization has 
established a technical committee (ISO/TC 307)  for 
interoperability and data exchange on distributed ledger 
technologies [22]. Regarding the realization of network 
effects, permissionless blockchains are advantageous by 
allowing spontaneous authentication of devices. 
Alternatively, hybrid- and multi-purpose chains able to 
combine interoperability and process efficiency. 
 
6. Impact on energy use cases 
 
After the identification of factors derived from 
literature and interviews, we now discuss their impact. 
Figure 2 depicts the line of argument between the 
identified factors and their relationship to use cases from 
the energy sector. Based on the qualitative data, 
relationships with strong effects are displayed in bold, 
while conditional or and weak relationships are 
displayed in dashed lines. 
 
6.1. Microgrids and local residential p2p-trade 
 
The prominent showcase built by LO3 and 
ConsenSys, the Brooklyn Microgrid (BMG) has proven 
technical feasibility of permissionless blockchains in 
microgrids. Similarly, the innogy spin-off company 
Conjoule operates a platform, allowing residential 
prosumers to sell excess electricity to local consumers, 
which is currently being piloted in two German cities 
[54]. The BMG use case’s market design has been 
evaluated in [26]. The authors consider the regulatory 
environment to be major challenge for microgrids. 
Residential P2P-trade is illegal in most jurisdictions and 
only feasible in the BMG by incorporating LO3 as a 
licensed utility. While the BMG originally relied on the 
conventional Ethereum blockchain, LO3 has recently 
teamed up with Siemens to develop a permissioned 
Ethereum solution, incorporating the Tendermint 
consensus mechanism [26]. 
In a multi-directional cellular energy distribution 
system, there is a necessity for entities that ensure 
compliance with physical restrictions.  Grid users must 
be known for that reason and possibly as well to fulfill 
other legal and regulatory requirements (taxation, 
know-your-customer laws). Accordingly, a private 
entity or consortium simplifies the operation of a 
microgrid. Further, the energy sector is experiencing a 
shift of power dynamics towards customers. 
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Blockchains eliminate the need for intermediaries since 
transactions can be placed without third parties [40].  
The increasing power of consumers incentives utilities 
to secure their market power. Customer-friendly 
products like smart home applications may be offered to 
influence switching costs, tighten path dependencies 
and thus prevent the realization of network effects. 
Simultaneously, cooperation with rent-seeking political 
representatives may occur to keep regulatory barriers in 
place, minimizing market threats of prosumer-driven 
projects. 
 
6.2. Grid services 
 
The increasing number of DER with fluctuating 
generation challenges existing means for grid 
monitoring and balancing. Based on a permissioned 
blockchain, Ponton deployed a software (Gridchain) in 
Austria to coordinate balancing power request between 
Transmission System Operators (TSOs), Distribution 
System Operators (DSOs) and aggregators within 
seconds [55]. A different project started as joint venture 
of transmission grid operator Tennet and the battery 
storage producer sonnen, aims to reduce the need for 
redispatch measures with home battery storage by 
utilizing the permissioned Hyperledger Fabric [56]. 
Also, the Rocky Mountain Institute is investigating 
blockchain based platforms applicability for DSOs [57]. 
Therefore, the associated Energy Web Foundation 
(EWF) is currently evaluating this use case for their 
permissioned blockchain solution. 
Monitoring the status of the grid and taking stability 
measures requires high-integrity data, which is 
available constantly and in near-real-time for a small 
number of participants (DSO, TSO). Today, only 
permissioned projects are focusing these services, since 
the grid is considered a critical infrastructure and the 
regulatory environment will only grant a small number 
of entities insight and control.  
 
6.3. Wholesale electricity markets 
 
Blockchains enable direct electricity trade without 
intermediaries. The Ponton Enerchain tool currently 
enables the wholesale trade for two dozen European 
utilities by the use of the Tendermint consensus 
algorithm for permissioned blockchains [31]. In contrast 
to that, ConsenSys is currently initializing Grid+, a 
project aiming to use a permissionless Ethereum-based 
platform incorporating state channels to connect 
consumers directly to the wholesale market [12]. The 
utilization of a state channels network can safeguard 
 
Figure 2. Research framework and relationships between factors and use cases  
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transaction speed and scalability of a permissionless 
blockchain to realize network externalities. 
While the reduction of transaction costs through 
disintermediation and transaction speed are major 
factors for wholesale trade, market power and rent-
seeking behavior have relevant impact, as stakeholders 
(traders and exchanges) may prefer consortium-
controlled or permissioned blockchain solutions. A 
permissionless blockchain may only be favored when a 
critical mass of participants can be achieved by an 
appropriate scalability mechanism as used in multi-
purpose chains.  
 
6.4. Asset management 
 
The monitoring, metering and status documentation 
of specific energy resources can be coordinated via 
blockchains. This way, data regarding ownership 
structures, load profiles, and maintenance status can be 
made available for engineers and investors. Currently, 
one of the interviewees is initializing an asset 
management pilot study, utilizing the Ethereum 
blockchain for valuation of DER. Consulting services 
such as due diligence or asset valuations for municipal 
utilities can be automated with the aim to make small 
assets fungible. Investors of DER can benefit from 
transparent and high-integrity information. In contrast 
to grid services, in asset management a higher number 
of network participants may rely on the stored data. 
Therefore, employing a permissionless blockchain 
requires a scalable consensus mechanism like PoS. 
 
6.5. Certification of green electricity 
 
Renewable power plants typically must be certified 
by multiple institutions through costly processes to trade 
Renewable Energy Certificates (REC). Residential 
customers do usually not receive reliable information on 
their actual share of green energy. Therefore, the startup 
StromDAO has implemented a real-time electricity 
account, utilizing the a PoA version of the Ethereum 
blockchain. The electricity consumption of households 
is being evaluated by an index indicating the share of 
renewables in the regional energy mix. Depending on 
their consumption and procurement behavior, 
participating households receive tokens 
(Grünstromjetons) corresponding to their individual 
share of green electricity [19]. A different approach is 
tested by the Chinese Energy-Blockchain Lab using 
IBM’s Hyperledger. This permissioned blockchain 
serves as a common ledger for carbon emission quotas 
to incentivize ecological behavior among China’s 
industrial companies. Hyperledger allows transactions 
to be either confidential or public, fostering the 
transparency of the energy generation process [58]. 
A green energy certificates ledger must build on 
reliable information, accessible to stakeholders and 
citizens. While both permissionless and permissioned 
blockchains can grant transparency of information, the 
latter system can potentially disregard immutability and 
thus data integrity by cutting off the transaction history. 
When such a system is used to monitor ecological 
policies, decision makers may exhibit rent-seeking 
behavior when interest groups push for an installment 
of manipulable permissioned systems. 
 
6.6. E-mobility charging infrastructure 
 
The infrastructure of charging stations for electric 
vehicles is defined by a vast number of different 
providers with different procedures for billing and 
accounting. Currently, transactions are subject to 
numerous underlying processes between providers and 
intermediaries to identify users. The startup share & 
charge, a spin-off founded within the innogy innovation 
hub, currently operates a blockchain charging 
infrastructure with more than 1200 stations, partly 
owned by private citizens [21]. The company is using 
smart contracts on top of the permissionless Ethereum 
blockchain, to grant automatized transactions between 
charging stations and electric vehicles.  
Besides confidentiality of personal location data, and 
availability to safeguard charging at any given time, e-
mobility requires a system in which unknown nodes can 
carry out spontaneous transactions without prior 
identification. Although this could be provided by a 
permissionless blockchain as executed by [21], the e-
mobility environment already exhibits path dependence 
in form of pre-existing technologies. Further, devices 
have to be linked in order to enable compatibility in 
terms of seamless transactions and the exploitation of 
network externalities. Accordingly, the utilization of 
multi-purpose chains may be of interest for incumbent 
stakeholders. Alternatively, a permissionless blockchain 
that already has reached critical market dominance or 
far-reaching standardization efforts may provide similar 
potentials. 
 
7.  Conclusion & outlook 
 
In this paper, we investigated how and by which 
factors the implementation of blockchain technologies 
is affected in energy sector use cases. We have 
constructed an integrated research framework based on 
factors from DOI, TOE and institutional economics. On 
this foundation, we conducted semi-structured in-depth 
interviews with 22 experts from the energy sector, 
blockchain enterprises and research institutions. Based 
on the interviews, we used axial coding to identify 
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constructs related to the theory and analyzed their 
impact on the blockchain use cases. 
Both grid services and microgrids are clearly 
affected by power induced factors and technological 
constraints. Especially permissioned blockchains 
exhibit properties that equate with these factors, 
appropriating a system controlled by only few entities. 
The wholesale electricity trade exhibits strong 
relationships to technological constraints, while weak 
links to power-induced and network-related factors can 
be observed. The effects have counteracting directions, 
therefore either permissioned or scalable permissionless 
solutions could fit the requirements of a given project. 
Both asset management and certification of green 
electricity are affected by trust-supplementing factors, 
indicating a system with reliable data and potentially 
reading access for multiple entities. E-mobility charging 
infrastructure is strongly affected by network-related 
factors that indicate a requirement of open and 
interoperable systems, such a multi-purpose chains. 
This is the first scientific study to depict dynamics 
between blockchain use cases and theory-based 
determinants. The work provides insight in factors 
relevant to the implementation of blockchain use cases 
and the design of economic and political institutions for 
the regulation of blockchain technologies. However, the 
study is limited by its focus on the energy sector and is 
thus lacking generalizability. While we only 
interviewed about two dozen experts, we do not aim to 
develop new theories but rather to contribute to the 
understanding of the dynamics in a specific socio-
technological context. For future research, we aim to 
supplement our qualitative research with a quantitative 
analysis to validate the results. We further consider an 
extension of this approach to other industries. 
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